Everything You Need to Know about Immediate Inferences

Sandra LaFave

 

Categorical statements always begin with one of the following three quantifiers: “all”, “no”, or “some”.

 

The subject and predicate terms must be general terms, i.e., plural nouns or noun phrases.  The letters “S” and “P” should be understood to indicate the terms in the subject (“S”) and predicate (“P”) positions in the statement. 

 

The verb is always the same: “are”, understood in the copulative sense of the verb “to be”.

 

The word “not” appears in the O proposition only, after the copula. 

 

There are four categorical statement forms, as shown in the table below.

 

Form

Name

Quantity

Quality

Distribution of S term

Distribution of P term

All Ss are Ps

A

Universal

Affirmative

Distributed

Undistributed

No Ss are Ps

E

Universal

Negative

Distributed

Distributed

Some Ss are Ps

I

Particular

Affirmative

Undistributed

Undistributed

Some Ss are not Ps

O

Particular

Negative

Undistributed

Distributed

 

(“All Ss are not Ps” is syntactically ambiguous and therefore not a categorical statement form.)

 

The affirmative categoricals (A and I) are named from the Latin word “affirmo”.

The negative categoricals (E and O) are named from the Latin word “nego”.

 

A term is distributed in a categorical if the statement says something about all the members of the class denoted by the term. The attributes of the “S” term (e.g., the subject term is distributed in the A statement) apply to whatever term is in the subject position; for example, if you flipped the subject and predicate terms, then “P” would be in the subject position and would therefore be distributed. 

 

Mnemonics for remembering distribution:  (1) “AsEbInOp”; (2) “Any student earning Bs is not on probation”; (3) Universals (A and E) distribute subjects; negatives (E and O) distribute predicates.

 

Aristotelian and Boolean Interpretations

 

The universals are A (“All Ss are Ps”) and E (“No Ss are Ps”).  The interpretation of universals is different in the traditional (Aristotelian) and modern (Boolean) approaches.

 

The Aristotelian interpretation of A is “If anything is an S, it’s a P; and Ss exist.”

The Aristotelian interpretation of E is “If anything is an S, it isn’t a P; and Ss exist.”

 

The Boolean (modern) interpretation of A is “If anything is an S, it’s a P”.  Period.  We don’t assume Ss exist.

The Boolean (modern) interpretation of E is “If anything is an S, it’s not a P.”  Period.  We don’t assume Ss exist.

 

The particulars are I (“Some Ss are Ps”) and O “Some Ss are not Ps”).  The particulars have the same meaning in both the Aristotelian and Boolean interpretations.  Both I and O make existence claims, and thus have metaphysical as well as logical import.

 

The I statement means “At least one thing exists that is both S and P”.

 

The O statement says “At least one thing exists that is S and not P.”

 

Both interpretations (Aristotelian and Boolean) of the universals (A and E) have their advantages.  People do mostly talk about existing things, so the Aristotelian approach captures that.  The Aristotelian approach allows you to infer I from A; that is, if the premise “All Ss are Ps” is true, it follows that “Some Ss are Ps”. This inference is called subalternation. Usually there’s no problem with that: people would agree that if it’s true that all apples are fruit, it must be true that some apples are fruit.  But note that the I proposition is always understood to make an existence claim. “Some apples are fruit” means “There exists at least one thing that is both an apple and a fruit.”  And that’s fine as long as apples exist in the first place. 

 

Since the Aristotelian approach assumes Ss exist, it is impossible (on the Aristotelian interpretation) for both I and O to be false; one or the other or both must be true.  If at least one S exists, it’s either in P or it’s not; it can’t be in neither.   This is called the subcontrary relationship between I and O.

 

Also, since the Aristotelian approach assumes Ss exist, then if A is true, E is necessarily false; and if E is true, A is necessarily false.  For example, if WVC students exist, then if it’s true that “All WVC students are human” it must be false that “No WVC students are human”. This is called the contrary relationship between A and E.

 

The down side of the Aristotelian approach is that people don’t always talk about things that exist.  For example, the A statement “All unicorns are one-horned animals” has a non-denoting term (“unicorns”) as subject.  In that case, you wouldn’t want to allow the subalternation inference from A to I, since the existence claim in the I statement would be false: it’s false that there exists at least one thing that is both a unicorn and a one-horned animal.  Furthermore, if Ss don’t exist, you wouldn’t want to say that if A is true, E must be false (the contrary relation).  On the Aristotelian interpretation, you’d have to say that if “All unicorns are one-horned animals” is true, then “No unicorns are one-horned animals” must be false.  That seems wrong, since if unicorns don’t exist in the first place, the statement “No unicorns are one-horned animals” seems just as true as “All unicorns are one-horned animals”. 

 

The advantage of the Boolean approach is that it’s more general, allowing logic to handle arguments that deal with non-existent Ss.  The Boolean approach does not allow the subalternation inference from A to I, nor does it allow the contrary relationship between A and E, nor the subcontrary relationship between I and O.  If Ss don’t exist, then A does not imply I nor does E imply O.  If Ss don’t exist, both I and E could be false.  If Ss don’t exist, then both A and E could be true.

 

 

Venn Diagrams

In Venn diagrams, each term gets a circle.  Each categorical statement contains two terms, S and P.  So we begin with two intersecting circles. 

                                               

 

Area 1 is the area of things that are S but not P.

Area 2 is the area of things that are both S and P.

Area 3 is the area of things that are P but not S.

Area 4 (everything outside the intersecting circles) is everything else.

 

How to mark a Venn diagram:

1.     Shade an area:  means the area is empty (has no members)

2.     Uncircled X in an area: means the area is non-empty (has at least one member) in both traditional and Boolean interpretations

3.     Circled X in an area: means the area is non-empty in the traditional interpretation only

4.     No mark in area: not enough information to say whether this area has members or not

 

                                               Traditional (Aristotelian) Universals

 

Trad A: If anything is S, it’s P; and Ss exist.              Trad E: If anything is S, it’s not P, and Ss exist.

                                                  

           

 

                                                    


                                               Modern (Boolean) Universals

 

           Modern A: If anything is S, it’s P.                              Modern E: If anything is S, it’s not P.

                                               

 

 

   

                            Particulars – same in Aristotelian and Boolean interpretations

 

      I: Something exists that is both S and P.                        O: Something exists that is both S and not P.

                                               

 

 

 

Contradictories

Two statements are contradictories of each other if they always have opposite truth values, i.e.,

·         if one is true, the other is false

            AND

·         If one is false, the other is true.

 

In categorical logic, the pairs of contradictories are

            A and O

            and

            E and I.

These pairs of statements are contradictory in both the Boolean (modern) or Aristotelian (traditional) interpretations of the universals.  In fact, the Boolean square of opposition (below) contains only the contradictories.

 

Using Venn diagrams, you can see why A and O are contradictory: If A is true (in either the Boolean or Aristotelian interpretations), area 1 is shaded (i.e., empty).  But in O, area 1 has an X  (i.e., not empty).  Since area 1 is either empty or not, one or the other, A or O, must be true, but never both.

 

Using Venn diagrams, you can also see why E and I are contradictory. If E is true (in either the Boolean or Aristotelian interpretations), area 2 is shaded (i.e., empty).  But in the I proposition, area 2 has an X  (i.e., not empty).  Since area 2 is either empty or not, one or the other, E or I, must be true, but never both.

 

 

The Modern Square of Opposition

There’s not much to the modern square of opposition – just the two pairs of contradictories. 

 

 

 

 

The Modern Square of Opposition in Table Form

 

Contradictories

A is true

O is false

E is true

I is false

I is true

E is false

O is true

A is false

A is false

O is true

E is false

I is true

I is false

E is true

O is false

A is true

 

 

The Traditional Square of Opposition

 

Your textbook shows the traditional square of opposition.  Here are a few alternative depictions. Use whatever you find useful.

            1.  From Lander University (philosophy.lander.edu/logic/square.html)

 

 

            2. From Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Square_of_opposition)

 


 

            3.  The Traditional Square of Opposition in Table Form

 

 

Contradictories

Contraries (A and E)

Subcontraries (I and O)

Subalternation

A is true

False O

False E

N/A

I is true

E is true

False I

False A

N/A

O is true

I is true

False E

N/A

U – both subcontraries may be T

N/A

O is true

False A

N/A

U – both subcontraries may be T

N/A

A is false

True O

U – both contraries may be F

N/A

N/A

E is false

True I

U – both contraries may be F

N/A

N/A

I is false

True E

N/A

O is true

A is false

O is false

True A

N/A

I is true

E is false

 

Contraries

The contrary relationship holds between A and E in the traditional (Aristotelian) interpretation ONLY.

Two statements are contraries of each other if

·         if one is true, the other is false

            BUT

·         If one is false, the other’s truth value is undetermined (both statement might be false).

 

In categorical logic, there is one pair of contraries:  A and E  in the traditional interpretation only

In the modern (Boolean) square of opposition, there is no contrary relationship between any two categoricals.

 

Using the traditional Aristotelian Venn diagrams, here’s why A and E are contraries.  Look closely at the diagrams for traditional A and E above. 

 

If the traditional A proposition is true, then, area 2 is non-empty, which means that E (which claims area 2 is empty) must be false.  Likewise, if the traditional E is true, area 1 is non-empty, which means A must be false.  Thus if A is true, E is false, and if E is true, A is false.

 

Why might both be false? We can easily think of examples that demonstrate the possibility that an A and an E can both be false.  For example, “All WVC students are female” (an A proposition) is false, and so is “No WVC students are female” (an E proposition).

 

A and E are NOT contraries in the Boolean interpretation, however, since the Boolean A diagram shades area 1 only, and the Boolean E diagram shades area 2 only.  The diagram for A contains no information about area 2, and the diagram for E contains no information about area 1. 

 

Subcontraries

Two statements are subcontraries of each other if

·         if one is false, the other is true

            BUT

·         If one is true, the other’s truth value is undetermined (both statement might be true).

 

In categorical logic, there is one pair of subcontraries:  I and O in the traditional interpretation only

In the modern square of opposition, there is no subcontrary relationship between any two categoricals.

 

Using Venn diagrams, here’s why I and O are subcontraries in the Aristotelian interpretation:

 

The Venn diagram for the I statement (in both the traditional and modern sesnses) says area 2 is non-empty (has an X) – something exists here.

The Venn diagram for the O statement (in both the traditional and modern sesnses) says area 1 is non-empty (has an X) – something exists here.

 

Since the Aristotelian interpretation assumes that Ss exist; of course, that’s what makes the traditional interpretation different from the modern one. Thus any individual S must be either in P or not in P, and one or the other of the diagrams (I or O) must be correct for any S. Furthermore, if more than one S exists, it is possible some might be P AND some non-P. In either case – whether there is only one S or more than one – areas 1 and 2 are never both empty, i.e., either area 1 is non-empty or 2 is non-empty (or both).

 

I and O are NOT subcontraries in the Boolean interpretation, however.  The Boolean interpretation does not assume the existence of Ss. If we don’t assume the existence of Ss, both area 1 and area 2 could be empty. In the Boolean interpretation, when we put an X in area 1 or 2, we’re claiming that Ss exist.

 

Subalternation

The subalternation relationship is a relationship of implication, i.e., it concerns a couple of pairs of arguments, where we ask whether the conclusion must be true if the premise is true.

 

The relationships in these arguments are not commutative; validity only works in one direction, from premise to conclusion. 

 

Pair 1 Subalterns (same quality, with true universal premise to true particular conclusion):

(1)         Premise:                        A                      (2)         Premise:                        E

         Conclusion:                          I                              Conclusion:                        O

Assuming the same quality, in the Pair 1 subalternations, the premise is always the universal; the conclusion is always the particular.

 

Pair 1 subalternation arguments are valid in the traditional interpretation as long as Ss exist.  If the argument has the subalternation form but Ss don’t exist, we say the argument is invalid because it contains the existential fallacy.

 

Pair 2 Subalterns  (same quality, with false particular premise to false universal conclusion):

(1)         Premise:                        I is false             (2)         Premise:                        O is false.

         Conclusion:                       A is false.                   Conclusion:                          E is false.

 

Assuming the same quality, in the Pair 2 subalternations, the premise is always the negation of the particular; the conclusion is always the negation of the universal. Again, these arguments are valid in the Aristotelian interpretation as long as Ss exist.  Here’s why.

 

Consider argument (1) of the second pair of subalterns: false I implies false A. By the contradictory relationship (which holds for both Boolean and Aristotelian views), if I is false, E is true.  And in the Aristotelian view, since E and A are contraries, if E is true, A must be false!

 

Consider argument (2) of the second pair of subalterns: false O implies false E. By the contradictory relationship (which holds for both Boolean and Aristotelian views), if O is false, A is true.  And in the Aristotelian view, since E and A are contraries, if A is true, E must be false.

 

 

 

 


Sandy's X10 Host Home Page | Sandy's Google Sites Home Page
Questions or comments? sandy_lafave@yahoo.com